The Cuban missile crisis October 1962
The world on the brink of a nuclear war
In the early nineties of the past century we went to the Stanford University in Palo Alto. While Willem was in meetings, I went to bookstores in search of novel social scientific literature. During this activity a book fell into my hands containing the transcripts of the top secret tapes of the Kennedy administration during the Cuban missile crisis. I immediately bought the book, eager to study these decisions which prevented a nuclear war.
I still remember the time of this crisis: I was an apolitical teenager and mainly interested in the elegant appearance of Jacqueline Kennedy, while the adults around me were scared to death of a third world war. In contrast to me, Willem was aware of the seriousness of the situation and watched fearfully with his fellow students the evolution of the crisis on television.
I still remember the time of this crisis: I was an apolitical teenager and mainly interested in the elegant appearance of Jacqueline Kennedy, while the adults around me were scared to death of a third world war. In contrast to me, Willem was aware of the seriousness of the situation and watched fearfully with his fellow students the evolution of the crisis on television.
Political Background
On October 16, 1962 president Kennedy called together in great hurry a group of his closest advisers to discuss the Central Intelligence Agency´s discovery of Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction on the island of Cuba. The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had already been strained for some time, not only with respect to Cuba. In 1961 the Soviets wanted the Western powers to withdraw from Berlin. Since they did not comply the Soviets let construct a wall in order to terminate with the emigration of East Germans to the West (Berlin crisis). The attempt to install nuclear weapons in Cuba can therefore be considered as the culmination of deteriorating relations between these two superpowers.
On October 16, 1962 president Kennedy called together in great hurry a group of his closest advisers to discuss the Central Intelligence Agency´s discovery of Soviet nuclear missile sites under construction on the island of Cuba. The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had already been strained for some time, not only with respect to Cuba. In 1961 the Soviets wanted the Western powers to withdraw from Berlin. Since they did not comply the Soviets let construct a wall in order to terminate with the emigration of East Germans to the West (Berlin crisis). The attempt to install nuclear weapons in Cuba can therefore be considered as the culmination of deteriorating relations between these two superpowers.
The motive to develop Cuba into a full–scale strategic Soviet base 90 miles away from the United States seemed at least to be twofold. One of the reasons for the Soviets was to achieve more nuclear parity by having a credible deterrent in the Caribbean. The U.S. had already placed nuclear installations and military bases close to and even along Soviet borders such as the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. The other reason was to mitigate the constant threat from the United States to overthrow the regime of their ally Castro.
During the summer of 1962 The Soviets had transferred equipment and troops to Cuba which was monitored with great concern by the CIA. But only on October 15 they could identify with certainty the construction of Soviet missile installations.
From October 16 till October 28 President Kennedy held continuously meetings with advisory groups to seek a solution.
During the summer of 1962 The Soviets had transferred equipment and troops to Cuba which was monitored with great concern by the CIA. But only on October 15 they could identify with certainty the construction of Soviet missile installations.
From October 16 till October 28 President Kennedy held continuously meetings with advisory groups to seek a solution.
Decision Phase 1: October 16 through October 22, 1962
During the first meetings the presidential advisory group searched for strategies, considered consequences and tried to assess why Chairmen Khrushchev played such a reckless game. They reviewed several military actions, ranging from a surprise air attack on Cuba to a full scale invasion of this country. The political approaches were to negotiate with Khrushchev and eventually with Castro, inform the United Nations and the allies and blockade Cuba so that no more material could enter the island. Uncertainty about the amount of missiles and whether or not they were operational overshadowed the discussions. Several advisors offered to the president argumentations for a preferred course of action. But within the frame of this text, we will only present two argumentations.
On October 17, Adlai Stevenson, the ambassador to the United Nations, offered his advice to President Kennedy. If they made a surprise air attack on Cuba to take out the missiles (S1), it was very likely that the Soviets would take reprisals elsewhere (O12, O13). More specifically he considered the possibility of an attack on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey or countermeasures in West Berlin, where the Soviets could, for instance, deny access to the allied powers. Furthermore it was possible that they would encounter sharp differences with the Latin American (OAS) and NATO allies (O12) and it even was possible that the Soviets would provoke a nuclear war (O12). There was of course also the possibility that no nuclear war occurred (O13).
If the United States was to send envoys to Castro and the Soviets with the message that they had to restore the status quo ante or otherwise the U.S. would restore it, and thereafter negotiate about missile bases in the context of a disarmament treaty (S2), the ambassador thought that there was a greater chance of a positive outcome, and in fact, that there might even be no Soviet reprisals elsewhere (O21).
From the above it is clear that Stevenson recommended S2.
During the first meetings the presidential advisory group searched for strategies, considered consequences and tried to assess why Chairmen Khrushchev played such a reckless game. They reviewed several military actions, ranging from a surprise air attack on Cuba to a full scale invasion of this country. The political approaches were to negotiate with Khrushchev and eventually with Castro, inform the United Nations and the allies and blockade Cuba so that no more material could enter the island. Uncertainty about the amount of missiles and whether or not they were operational overshadowed the discussions. Several advisors offered to the president argumentations for a preferred course of action. But within the frame of this text, we will only present two argumentations.
On October 17, Adlai Stevenson, the ambassador to the United Nations, offered his advice to President Kennedy. If they made a surprise air attack on Cuba to take out the missiles (S1), it was very likely that the Soviets would take reprisals elsewhere (O12, O13). More specifically he considered the possibility of an attack on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey or countermeasures in West Berlin, where the Soviets could, for instance, deny access to the allied powers. Furthermore it was possible that they would encounter sharp differences with the Latin American (OAS) and NATO allies (O12) and it even was possible that the Soviets would provoke a nuclear war (O12). There was of course also the possibility that no nuclear war occurred (O13).
If the United States was to send envoys to Castro and the Soviets with the message that they had to restore the status quo ante or otherwise the U.S. would restore it, and thereafter negotiate about missile bases in the context of a disarmament treaty (S2), the ambassador thought that there was a greater chance of a positive outcome, and in fact, that there might even be no Soviet reprisals elsewhere (O21).
From the above it is clear that Stevenson recommended S2.
.In the next days several advisers recommended different options to president Kennedy. The advisory group feverishly searched for more intelligence information and General Taylor warned the president that he could only guarantee to eliminate a great deal of the nuclear weapons by air strikes, but not all, since many could be hidden. So the majority of the group was inclined to start with a blockade of Cuba.
In the following table we summarize the support of the special counsel to the president, Theodore Sorensen, for the blockade. He reasoned as follows. If the United States made a surprise attack (S2) this would lead to an invasion of Cuba because air strikes alone would prove to be insufficient. There would then be many casualties which could be seen as an U.S. initiated Pearl Harbour and it would lead to a general war (O21).
However, if they started with the blockade of Cuba (S1), which does not preclude military action later on, it was most likely that no war would occur and the Soviets back down and abandon Castro (O12). Sorensen chose the alternative with the highest probability of a positive outcome.
On October 22 President Kennedy informed the nation about the crisis by a TV speech in which he announced the initiation of the naval blockade of Cuba.
In the following table we summarize the support of the special counsel to the president, Theodore Sorensen, for the blockade. He reasoned as follows. If the United States made a surprise attack (S2) this would lead to an invasion of Cuba because air strikes alone would prove to be insufficient. There would then be many casualties which could be seen as an U.S. initiated Pearl Harbour and it would lead to a general war (O21).
However, if they started with the blockade of Cuba (S1), which does not preclude military action later on, it was most likely that no war would occur and the Soviets back down and abandon Castro (O12). Sorensen chose the alternative with the highest probability of a positive outcome.
On October 22 President Kennedy informed the nation about the crisis by a TV speech in which he announced the initiation of the naval blockade of Cuba.
Decision Phase 2: October 23 through October 28
Since President Kennedy had sent a copy of his speech in advance to Chairman Khrushchev he waited for his answer. Khrushchev´s answer was disappointing because he repeated the statement of his diplomats that these weapons only were defensive and declared that Soviet ships might not respect the blockade as it was in violation of international law. On October 24 the blockade was effective. On this day Khrushchev ordered four missile transport ships, which were still on high sea, to turn around. But reconnaissance missions above Cuba showed that the construction of the sites continued.
President Kennedy´s advisors were divided in hawks and doves. The hawks advocated an air strike against Cuba followed by an invasion, because in their view the blockade would most likely lead to further escalation and reprisals in kind. With the military option it was according to them more likely to eliminate the weapons and re-establish their prestige. The allies´ position, the amount of victims and the use of nuclear weapons they left out of their considerations. The doves, in contrary, hoped about some success of diplomacy at the UN level. However, the U.S. military preparations continued and also the Soviet Union put its armed forces on alert.
Since President Kennedy had sent a copy of his speech in advance to Chairman Khrushchev he waited for his answer. Khrushchev´s answer was disappointing because he repeated the statement of his diplomats that these weapons only were defensive and declared that Soviet ships might not respect the blockade as it was in violation of international law. On October 24 the blockade was effective. On this day Khrushchev ordered four missile transport ships, which were still on high sea, to turn around. But reconnaissance missions above Cuba showed that the construction of the sites continued.
President Kennedy´s advisors were divided in hawks and doves. The hawks advocated an air strike against Cuba followed by an invasion, because in their view the blockade would most likely lead to further escalation and reprisals in kind. With the military option it was according to them more likely to eliminate the weapons and re-establish their prestige. The allies´ position, the amount of victims and the use of nuclear weapons they left out of their considerations. The doves, in contrary, hoped about some success of diplomacy at the UN level. However, the U.S. military preparations continued and also the Soviet Union put its armed forces on alert.
A narrow escape
In this tense situation a letter of Chairman Khrushchev arrived on October 26 in Washington in which he proposed that the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba so that there was no more necessity to keep his weapons there. President Kennedy became slightly optimistic that Moscow wanted to avoid military action. But when he and his advisors prepared on October 27 an answer to this letter a new message arrived where Khrushchev asked instead of the pledge not to invade Cuba, the dismantlement of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. This demand was very difficult to realize since the NATO allies might not accept it.
The information that a U-2 reconnaissance plane was downed in Cuba raised again the tension. Kennedy was so wise to ignore this event and decided finally to accept Khrushchev´s offer of October 26 and to send his brother, Robert Kennedy, to the Soviet ambassador with the message that they would dismantle the Jupiter missiles within some months in silence.
On October 28 , while the advisory committee was reviewing various military measures for the next day, a letter from Chairman Khrushchev reached them, indicating that he would withdraw the missiles. With this message the crisis was effectively terminated and everybody was happy that the world was saved from a full scale nuclear war withall its consequences.
In this tense situation a letter of Chairman Khrushchev arrived on October 26 in Washington in which he proposed that the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba so that there was no more necessity to keep his weapons there. President Kennedy became slightly optimistic that Moscow wanted to avoid military action. But when he and his advisors prepared on October 27 an answer to this letter a new message arrived where Khrushchev asked instead of the pledge not to invade Cuba, the dismantlement of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. This demand was very difficult to realize since the NATO allies might not accept it.
The information that a U-2 reconnaissance plane was downed in Cuba raised again the tension. Kennedy was so wise to ignore this event and decided finally to accept Khrushchev´s offer of October 26 and to send his brother, Robert Kennedy, to the Soviet ambassador with the message that they would dismantle the Jupiter missiles within some months in silence.
On October 28 , while the advisory committee was reviewing various military measures for the next day, a letter from Chairman Khrushchev reached them, indicating that he would withdraw the missiles. With this message the crisis was effectively terminated and everybody was happy that the world was saved from a full scale nuclear war withall its consequences.
For an excellent summary of this extreme dangerous period I recommend the video below