The decision to use the atomic bomb
In the past we have made an elaborate study of political argumentation for decisions and we have seen how simpel in general these arguments are. There is one political decision made of which the consequences have played a more permanent role during all our life. That is the decision of president Truman to use atomic weapons to end the war against Japan in 1945. Given the serious consequences of this decision for the world, we decided to investigate this decision in more detail as our last project in this context.
A brief summary of the historical process
As for most recent weapons, the US started the development of the atomic bomb during WW II because they realized that they could develop this weapon and therefore they expected that Germany would also build such a weapon. After Germany surrendered it turned out that Germany had not developed such a weapon. When president Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 the war with Japan was still going on. Harry Truman became the next president. Two weeks later he was informed by Harry Stimson, the secretary of war, about the atomic bomb.
The Book of Stoff et al. The Manhattan Project, 1991 contains memorandum 38 which he used in this briefing:
1. We will have in 4 months a bomb that could destroy a whole city
2. Physically the US is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years
3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely;
a. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.
b. …. It is extremely probable, that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a larger nation in a much shorter time.
4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a wilful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one, although probably the only nation which could enter into production within the next years is Russia.
5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technological development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.
6. To approach any world peace organization would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control of this weapon heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace.
7. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so, shared upon what terms, becomes a primary question of foreign relations. Also, our leadership in the war and the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.
8. On the other hand if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.
9. As stated in General Groves´report, steps are under way looking towards the establishment of a select committee of particular qualifications for recommending action to the Executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect. The committee would also recommend the actions to be taken by the War department prior to that time in anticipation of the post-war problems. All recommendations would of course be first submitted to the President.
As for most recent weapons, the US started the development of the atomic bomb during WW II because they realized that they could develop this weapon and therefore they expected that Germany would also build such a weapon. After Germany surrendered it turned out that Germany had not developed such a weapon. When president Franklin Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 the war with Japan was still going on. Harry Truman became the next president. Two weeks later he was informed by Harry Stimson, the secretary of war, about the atomic bomb.
The Book of Stoff et al. The Manhattan Project, 1991 contains memorandum 38 which he used in this briefing:
1. We will have in 4 months a bomb that could destroy a whole city
2. Physically the US is at present in the position of controlling the resources with which to construct and use it and no other nation could reach this position for some years
3. Nevertheless it is practically certain that we could not remain in this position indefinitely;
a. Various segments of its discovery and production are widely known among many scientists in many countries, although few scientists are now acquainted with the whole process which we have developed.
b. …. It is extremely probable, that much easier and cheaper methods of production will be discovered by scientists in the future, together with the use of materials of much wider distribution. As a result, it is extremely probable that the future will make it possible to be constructed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a larger nation in a much shorter time.
4. As a result, it is indicated that the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a wilful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one, although probably the only nation which could enter into production within the next years is Russia.
5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technological development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed.
6. To approach any world peace organization would seem to be unrealistic. No system of control of this weapon heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace.
7. Furthermore, in the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so, shared upon what terms, becomes a primary question of foreign relations. Also, our leadership in the war and the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further.
8. On the other hand if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.
9. As stated in General Groves´report, steps are under way looking towards the establishment of a select committee of particular qualifications for recommending action to the Executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect. The committee would also recommend the actions to be taken by the War department prior to that time in anticipation of the post-war problems. All recommendations would of course be first submitted to the President.
In this briefing we see that some dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and the difficulties of the post war situation have been clearly indicated, including the possible consequence that “modern civilization might be completely destroyed”.
The president created an Interim committee to council him concerning the weapon and the publicity and the post-war legislature and organisation of nuclear energy with Stimson as the head of this commission.
On initiative of Secretary of State Grew, it was discussed since late May to issue a proclamation that would urge the Japanese to surrender and would assure them that they would permit the Japanese Emperor to remain the head of the state. The Cabinet colleagues and Joint chiefs of staff agreed that this proclamation should be presented in Potsdam where the US, USSR and UK would meet.
Around the same time, late May 1945, discussions took place in the interim commission about the use of the new developed atomic bomb. Compton, member of the Interim commission, suggested instead of direct use of the bomb, a nonmilitary demonstration to convince Japan that it made no sense to continue the war.The members of the commission saw risks of failure and of a not convincing demonstration. Therefore an advice was asked on this point from a panel of scientists.
On initiative of Secretary of State Grew, it was discussed since late May to issue a proclamation that would urge the Japanese to surrender and would assure them that they would permit the Japanese Emperor to remain the head of the state. The Cabinet colleagues and Joint chiefs of staff agreed that this proclamation should be presented in Potsdam where the US, USSR and UK would meet.
Around the same time, late May 1945, discussions took place in the interim commission about the use of the new developed atomic bomb. Compton, member of the Interim commission, suggested instead of direct use of the bomb, a nonmilitary demonstration to convince Japan that it made no sense to continue the war.The members of the commission saw risks of failure and of a not convincing demonstration. Therefore an advice was asked on this point from a panel of scientists.
The discussions in this panel between Compton, Oppenheimer, Lawrence and Fermi led to the conclusion that they did not see any solution for a demonstration of the force of the bomb to convince the Japanese to accept surrender without a real demonstration where people would be killed. Only using the bomb in the war would save lives and shorten the war. This became the definite opinion of the interim commission.
Why this was so is not clarified, neither the possibility to make a demonstration and if that is not enough to use the weapon on a real military target.
On June 6, Stimson mentioned that the interim commission had suggested that after the bomb would have been used, an international committee of control should be constituted with full power of inspection of the development of nuclear weapons. Although they had their doubts about this, only information would be given to countries which agree with the control.
A reaction of scientists from Chicago
The initiative came from Leo Szilard and Niels Bohr, two famous physicists, who were worried about the possible consequences of nuclear weapons in the future. They appointed James Franck, associate director of the chemistry division of the Metlab in Chicago, as chairman of the committee to explore the political and social implications of the yet-untested bomb.
On June 12 Compton sent the Franck report (document 49) to Stimson: to the attention of Mr. George Harrison, another member of the Interim commission.
The premise of this document was: that the atomic bomb opened the way to “total mutual destruction of all nations”.
The seven scientists of the committee suggested that the military conventions of the past were irrelevant. Even “a quantitative advantage in reserves of bottled destructive power will not make us safe from a sudden attack. In no other type of warfare does the advantage lie so heavily with the aggressor.”
A reaction of scientists from Chicago
The initiative came from Leo Szilard and Niels Bohr, two famous physicists, who were worried about the possible consequences of nuclear weapons in the future. They appointed James Franck, associate director of the chemistry division of the Metlab in Chicago, as chairman of the committee to explore the political and social implications of the yet-untested bomb.
On June 12 Compton sent the Franck report (document 49) to Stimson: to the attention of Mr. George Harrison, another member of the Interim commission.
The premise of this document was: that the atomic bomb opened the way to “total mutual destruction of all nations”.
The seven scientists of the committee suggested that the military conventions of the past were irrelevant. Even “a quantitative advantage in reserves of bottled destructive power will not make us safe from a sudden attack. In no other type of warfare does the advantage lie so heavily with the aggressor.”
Here again the possibility of a mutual destruction of all nations is mentioned as a possible consequence. This idea has led later to the official defense theory based on mutual destruction.
The Franck report also urged policymakers to refrain from using the bomb against Japan without a demonstration before the eyes of representatives of all United Nations. ”It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon as indiscriminately as the rocket bomb and a million times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement.”
This group also saw it as absolutely impossible that the country that was the first to use this weapon would promote the abolishment of this weapon.
The commission also mentioned. “From this point of view, a demonstration of the new weapon might best be made before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be achieved if America could say to the world “You see what sort of weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to renounce the use in the future if other nations join us in this renunciation and agree to the establishment of an efficient international control.”
Although all these comments were known to Stimson and other members of the interim commission these arguments of the physicists never reached president Truman.
The next steps according to the memoirs of Truman
The proclamation of Grew was agreed by US, UK and Russia in the Potsdam conference and forwarded to the Japanese government, while the US had already another plan.
On July 16 the president was informed by Stimson about the successful test of the atomic bomb. He writes: “we were now in the possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of history and civilization.”
This group also saw it as absolutely impossible that the country that was the first to use this weapon would promote the abolishment of this weapon.
The commission also mentioned. “From this point of view, a demonstration of the new weapon might best be made before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be achieved if America could say to the world “You see what sort of weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to renounce the use in the future if other nations join us in this renunciation and agree to the establishment of an efficient international control.”
Although all these comments were known to Stimson and other members of the interim commission these arguments of the physicists never reached president Truman.
The next steps according to the memoirs of Truman
The proclamation of Grew was agreed by US, UK and Russia in the Potsdam conference and forwarded to the Japanese government, while the US had already another plan.
On July 16 the president was informed by Stimson about the successful test of the atomic bomb. He writes: “we were now in the possession of a weapon that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of history and civilization.”
Stimson flew to Potsdam for a complete report. This was shared with the Secretary of State Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Arnold and Admiral King.
The conclusion was: “We were not ready to make use of this weapon against the Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect the new weapon might have, physically or psychologically, when used against the enemy.”
So, they went on with the original plan, an invasion of the main land in two phases, first in the south and later close to Tokyo. General Marshall told the president that this plan might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy´s surrender on his home grounds.
However, when they realized that the test with the bomb was a incredible success, the Interim commission argued that the bomb should be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done without a warning. This would show the devastating strength.
Truman had realized that this would inflict “damage and casualties beyond imagination”. On the other hand, the scientific advisers of the commission reported: “We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.”
Truman wrote: “it was their conclusion that no technical demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. It had to be used against an enemy target.”
Here he suggested that it was not his decision but of the Interim commission to use the bomb on a real target and not in a demonstration.
Truman writes next: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.” It should be used as a military weapon “that meant that I wanted it dropped on a military target. I had told Stimson that the bomb should be dropped as nearly as possible upon a war production center of prime military importance.”
On July 24 the order was given to General Carl Spaatz to deliver the bombs on some of the chosen targets in the coming time, taking into account the weather on the target places.
On July 28 Radio Tokyo announces that the Japanese government would continue to fight. There was no formal reply to the ultimatum of the US, UK and Russia.
Then the bomb was scheduled to be dropped after August 3, unless Japan would surrender before this day. In the end it happened on August 6 with all consequences.
The conclusion was: “We were not ready to make use of this weapon against the Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect the new weapon might have, physically or psychologically, when used against the enemy.”
So, they went on with the original plan, an invasion of the main land in two phases, first in the south and later close to Tokyo. General Marshall told the president that this plan might cost half a million American lives to force the enemy´s surrender on his home grounds.
However, when they realized that the test with the bomb was a incredible success, the Interim commission argued that the bomb should be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done without a warning. This would show the devastating strength.
Truman had realized that this would inflict “damage and casualties beyond imagination”. On the other hand, the scientific advisers of the commission reported: “We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.”
Truman wrote: “it was their conclusion that no technical demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. It had to be used against an enemy target.”
Here he suggested that it was not his decision but of the Interim commission to use the bomb on a real target and not in a demonstration.
Truman writes next: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.” It should be used as a military weapon “that meant that I wanted it dropped on a military target. I had told Stimson that the bomb should be dropped as nearly as possible upon a war production center of prime military importance.”
On July 24 the order was given to General Carl Spaatz to deliver the bombs on some of the chosen targets in the coming time, taking into account the weather on the target places.
On July 28 Radio Tokyo announces that the Japanese government would continue to fight. There was no formal reply to the ultimatum of the US, UK and Russia.
Then the bomb was scheduled to be dropped after August 3, unless Japan would surrender before this day. In the end it happened on August 6 with all consequences.
On August 10 Japan surrendered based on the proclamation of the US, UK Russia in Potsdam.
On August 11 this proposal was in principle accepted by the allied forces.
Reconstruction of the argument for the use of the bomb
Based on this information we can reconstruct the argumentation of Truman and his interim commission to use the bomb as follows:
Our comment
However, in this argument several possible long-term consequences, that have been mentioned before, have been ignored.
For example it has been mentioned that: ”It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon as indiscriminately as the rocket bomb and a million times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement.”
If such an international agreement is not realized then other countries will also start the development of nuclear weapons. Already in his first meeting with president Truman, Stimson mentioned that:
“Smaller countries will be able to develop nuclear weapons and then the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a wilful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one, although probably the only nation which could enter into production within the next years is Russia.”
And also:
“A quantitative advantage in reserves of bottled destructive power will not make us safe from a sudden attack. In no other type of warfare does the advantage lie so heavily with the aggressor.”
The atomic bomb opened the way to “total mutual destruction of all nations”.
If these possible consequences were added to the possible outcomes of the direct use of the atomic bomb against Japan then this possible option would not have been attractive anymore.
On August 11 this proposal was in principle accepted by the allied forces.
Reconstruction of the argument for the use of the bomb
Based on this information we can reconstruct the argumentation of Truman and his interim commission to use the bomb as follows:
- There is no demonstration of the force of the atomic bomb outside the war situation that will convince Japan to surrender.
- If we would continue with the present strategy the war against Japan will go on and perhaps even 500.000 American soldiers and many more Japanese soldiers will be killed
- Direct use of the bomb will lead to an immediate surrender of Japan and save a lot of American lives but many Japanese people will be killed.
Our comment
However, in this argument several possible long-term consequences, that have been mentioned before, have been ignored.
For example it has been mentioned that: ”It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a weapon as indiscriminately as the rocket bomb and a million times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement.”
If such an international agreement is not realized then other countries will also start the development of nuclear weapons. Already in his first meeting with president Truman, Stimson mentioned that:
“Smaller countries will be able to develop nuclear weapons and then the future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a wilful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power. With its aid even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one, although probably the only nation which could enter into production within the next years is Russia.”
And also:
“A quantitative advantage in reserves of bottled destructive power will not make us safe from a sudden attack. In no other type of warfare does the advantage lie so heavily with the aggressor.”
The atomic bomb opened the way to “total mutual destruction of all nations”.
If these possible consequences were added to the possible outcomes of the direct use of the atomic bomb against Japan then this possible option would not have been attractive anymore.
On the other hand, the scientific commission saw as only solution to prevent an arms-race and a possible mutual destruction of all nations a demonstration. The Franck report says: “From this point of view, a demonstration of the new weapon might best be made before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island. The best possible atmosphere for the achievement of an international agreement could be achieved if America could say to the world: “You see what sort of weapon we had but did not use. We are ready to renounce the use in the future if other nations join us in this renunciation and agree to the establishment of an efficient international control.”
This argument makes the second option of a demonstration less negative than it has been evaluated in the decision making which took place between the president and his direct advisors, even if it would not have led to the immediate surrender of Japan.
Ignoring all this information which was available led to the use of the bomb, the expected arms race and several times nearly to a world war which could have led to the destruction of the world.
Our conclusion
We have come to the conclusion that too often the political arguments sound logical but that is only possible by omitting many important aspects of the decision problem. We have showed it here for the decision to use the atomic bomb. Lumer (2002) came to the same conclusion and tried to determine all the consequences of the climate change that was known at that time. With his elaborate study he tried to contribute as he wrote “to counterbalancing the, for the most part, appallingly short-sighed and egocentric political debate about this problem and the questions connected with it.”
Given that in general, as in the example shown above, more information is available but ignored, an important aspect of this problem is that the group of people deciding about these problems is too small and too homogeneous.
To select people by chance for the decision making is suggested as one of the solutions. This sounds strange but already in the time of Aristoteles in Athens, the 4th and 5th century B.C., such a random selection process of decision makers was preferred above the selection of decision makers on the basis of substantive criteria such a knowledge, status etc. Van Reybrouck (2013, pp 66) writes that Aristoteles called the system that was based on random selection of decision makers “democratic” and the other systems “not democratic”. Such an approach prevents that the decsions will not be biased in the direction of specific groups which are in the process in power.
A procedure based on random sampling of decision makers requires, of course, that this random sample of people, representative of the population, gets maximal information about all relevant aspects from experts in the topics connected with the decision to be made.
Fishkin (1991) has suggested the use of deliberate polls where a limited random sample of the population in a session gets as complete information as possible from different experts, discuss this information with each other and draw then their conclusions. This approach has been applied at several occasions, for different topics and selection of representatives, all around the world.
Saris, Neijens and De Ridder (1983) developed the Information and Choice questionnaire where a random sample of the population has to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of all the foreseen consequences of the different possible options for a decision problem before they can make their decision. In their first study, the decision problem concerned the energy supply in the Netherlands for the near future (Neijens, 1988). Later studies concerned referenda about urban and regional planning In the Netherlands. Later this approach has also been applied on decisions concerning CO2 problems.
These are just two alternative suggestions to solve the problem, we have illustrated in this part. Much more money should be spent on the development of approaches for better decision making. For the survival of human life on this planet this money would be well spent.
We are convinced that it will be possible to find sufficient qualified social science researchers who would like to spend their scientific life on this kind of research as much as we have enjoyed to do our research on this interesting topic.
This argument makes the second option of a demonstration less negative than it has been evaluated in the decision making which took place between the president and his direct advisors, even if it would not have led to the immediate surrender of Japan.
Ignoring all this information which was available led to the use of the bomb, the expected arms race and several times nearly to a world war which could have led to the destruction of the world.
Our conclusion
We have come to the conclusion that too often the political arguments sound logical but that is only possible by omitting many important aspects of the decision problem. We have showed it here for the decision to use the atomic bomb. Lumer (2002) came to the same conclusion and tried to determine all the consequences of the climate change that was known at that time. With his elaborate study he tried to contribute as he wrote “to counterbalancing the, for the most part, appallingly short-sighed and egocentric political debate about this problem and the questions connected with it.”
Given that in general, as in the example shown above, more information is available but ignored, an important aspect of this problem is that the group of people deciding about these problems is too small and too homogeneous.
To select people by chance for the decision making is suggested as one of the solutions. This sounds strange but already in the time of Aristoteles in Athens, the 4th and 5th century B.C., such a random selection process of decision makers was preferred above the selection of decision makers on the basis of substantive criteria such a knowledge, status etc. Van Reybrouck (2013, pp 66) writes that Aristoteles called the system that was based on random selection of decision makers “democratic” and the other systems “not democratic”. Such an approach prevents that the decsions will not be biased in the direction of specific groups which are in the process in power.
A procedure based on random sampling of decision makers requires, of course, that this random sample of people, representative of the population, gets maximal information about all relevant aspects from experts in the topics connected with the decision to be made.
Fishkin (1991) has suggested the use of deliberate polls where a limited random sample of the population in a session gets as complete information as possible from different experts, discuss this information with each other and draw then their conclusions. This approach has been applied at several occasions, for different topics and selection of representatives, all around the world.
Saris, Neijens and De Ridder (1983) developed the Information and Choice questionnaire where a random sample of the population has to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of all the foreseen consequences of the different possible options for a decision problem before they can make their decision. In their first study, the decision problem concerned the energy supply in the Netherlands for the near future (Neijens, 1988). Later studies concerned referenda about urban and regional planning In the Netherlands. Later this approach has also been applied on decisions concerning CO2 problems.
These are just two alternative suggestions to solve the problem, we have illustrated in this part. Much more money should be spent on the development of approaches for better decision making. For the survival of human life on this planet this money would be well spent.
We are convinced that it will be possible to find sufficient qualified social science researchers who would like to spend their scientific life on this kind of research as much as we have enjoyed to do our research on this interesting topic.
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