Dutch neutrality in World War I
Now that I had the documents I could start my research of the documents. The first study concerned the decsion making of the Dutch government concerning the Neutrality of the country in the beginning of the first World War.
When World War I broke out the Dutch wanted to continue with their strict neutral policy they had followed for more than 60 years. Although they hoped that their strategic position between the German and British Empires might be useful for the belligerents, they had no guarantee that they would respect it.
In the beginning of October 1914 the Germans besieged the Belgian harbour of Antwerp, which led to a dangerous situation since the harbour was only accessible by the Scheldt estuary which is Dutch territory. Although the Dutch government had already closed the Scheldt estuary, they feared that the British, as guarantors of Belgium neutrality, might force the access to Antwerp.
When World War I broke out the Dutch wanted to continue with their strict neutral policy they had followed for more than 60 years. Although they hoped that their strategic position between the German and British Empires might be useful for the belligerents, they had no guarantee that they would respect it.
In the beginning of October 1914 the Germans besieged the Belgian harbour of Antwerp, which led to a dangerous situation since the harbour was only accessible by the Scheldt estuary which is Dutch territory. Although the Dutch government had already closed the Scheldt estuary, they feared that the British, as guarantors of Belgium neutrality, might force the access to Antwerp.
The argumentations in the Council of Ministers
In this fatal situation the members of the Dutch Council of Ministers deliberated how they could stay out of the war. They considered the consequences of two strategies:
S1 To continue with the strict neutrality
S2 To depart from the strict neutrality if the British forced the Scheldt
Argumentation of the minister of War
The minister of War argued that if they would keep the strict neutrality it was possible that the British forced the Scheldt, liberated Antwerp and the German army withdrew through the Netherlands and devastated the country . He evaluated this outcome as most fatal. Although the minister did not mention explicitly the other outcome , it is self-evident that it also was possible that they would not get involved in the war.
If they would depart from the strict neutrality it was possible that they got involved in the war on the side of the British which was the side where their interests were lying. The other possible outcome, that they don´t get involved in the war, is not mentioned explicitly. Based on his argumentation he recommended to depart from the strict neutrality (S2) to avoid the most fatal outcome.
The minister of Navy reasoned similarly and also selected S2. These two military ministers evidently feared to get involved in the war and in this case preferred the British side.
In this fatal situation the members of the Dutch Council of Ministers deliberated how they could stay out of the war. They considered the consequences of two strategies:
S1 To continue with the strict neutrality
S2 To depart from the strict neutrality if the British forced the Scheldt
Argumentation of the minister of War
The minister of War argued that if they would keep the strict neutrality it was possible that the British forced the Scheldt, liberated Antwerp and the German army withdrew through the Netherlands and devastated the country . He evaluated this outcome as most fatal. Although the minister did not mention explicitly the other outcome , it is self-evident that it also was possible that they would not get involved in the war.
If they would depart from the strict neutrality it was possible that they got involved in the war on the side of the British which was the side where their interests were lying. The other possible outcome, that they don´t get involved in the war, is not mentioned explicitly. Based on his argumentation he recommended to depart from the strict neutrality (S2) to avoid the most fatal outcome.
The minister of Navy reasoned similarly and also selected S2. These two military ministers evidently feared to get involved in the war and in this case preferred the British side.
Argumentation of the minister of Colonies
The minister of Colonies argued that when continuing with the strict neutrality there was a small chance that the British took over their colonies which was of course negative. But he suggested that the chance was much higher that they would not lose them. When they would depart from the strict neutrality they certainly would get involved in the war at the British side and the German army would devastate the Netherlands. Based on his argument he advised to continue with the strict neutrality (S1).
The minister of Colonies argued that when continuing with the strict neutrality there was a small chance that the British took over their colonies which was of course negative. But he suggested that the chance was much higher that they would not lose them. When they would depart from the strict neutrality they certainly would get involved in the war at the British side and the German army would devastate the Netherlands. Based on his argument he advised to continue with the strict neutrality (S1).
Argumentation of the Prime Minister
The Prime Minister reasoned that if they maintained the strict neutrality the chance was very small that they got involved in the war, with internal dissent about the side and the destruction of the country. Although he does not say so this means that the chance was very high that they would not get involved in the war. But if they would depart from the strict neutrality the chances would be reversed. So he insisted to keep the strict neutrality (S1).
Choice of strategy
The other ministers argued similarly. Since the majority of the members of the Council of Ministers pleaded to stay strictly neutral (S1) because they expected to stay out of the war, this strategy was chosen. And fortunately Dutch neutrality was respected by the belligerents throughout World War I.
The Prime Minister reasoned that if they maintained the strict neutrality the chance was very small that they got involved in the war, with internal dissent about the side and the destruction of the country. Although he does not say so this means that the chance was very high that they would not get involved in the war. But if they would depart from the strict neutrality the chances would be reversed. So he insisted to keep the strict neutrality (S1).
Choice of strategy
The other ministers argued similarly. Since the majority of the members of the Council of Ministers pleaded to stay strictly neutral (S1) because they expected to stay out of the war, this strategy was chosen. And fortunately Dutch neutrality was respected by the belligerents throughout World War I.
Simple argumentations for vital decisions
This was the first document I analysed and we were quite surprised how simple the argumentations were with respect to such an important decision. The decision-making of the politicians also differed considerably from the mathematical model.
On the one hand the politicians spoke about strategies, probabilities and outcomes which were evaluated. But on the other hand they simplified things compared with the mathematical model: the minister of War did not rank-order the probabilities. He only indicated them as “possible” while the Prime Minister and the minister of Colonies rank-ordered them “small chance” etc.
They also should have rank-ordered the values of the outcomes in order to be able to apply the mathematical model. Here again the ministers used simplifications. They indicated them with words in the outcomes, having a positive or negative connotation, like “take over the colonies” or “destruction of the country”. Only the minister of War indicated one outcome as “most fatal”, while the values of the others were not rank-ordered.
Furthermore the ministers only considered two outcomes, even for such a vital decision. This means that one outcome was indicated explicitly e.g. “it is possible that we don´t get involved in the war”, while the other one was implicit: it is possible that we get involved in the war.
Finally they chose a strategy without indicating the choice rule. Perhaps these rules were obvious to them, but we as researchers would have to detect them and make them explicit. So far they were no clear to us.
This was the first document I analysed and we were quite surprised how simple the argumentations were with respect to such an important decision. The decision-making of the politicians also differed considerably from the mathematical model.
On the one hand the politicians spoke about strategies, probabilities and outcomes which were evaluated. But on the other hand they simplified things compared with the mathematical model: the minister of War did not rank-order the probabilities. He only indicated them as “possible” while the Prime Minister and the minister of Colonies rank-ordered them “small chance” etc.
They also should have rank-ordered the values of the outcomes in order to be able to apply the mathematical model. Here again the ministers used simplifications. They indicated them with words in the outcomes, having a positive or negative connotation, like “take over the colonies” or “destruction of the country”. Only the minister of War indicated one outcome as “most fatal”, while the values of the others were not rank-ordered.
Furthermore the ministers only considered two outcomes, even for such a vital decision. This means that one outcome was indicated explicitly e.g. “it is possible that we don´t get involved in the war”, while the other one was implicit: it is possible that we get involved in the war.
Finally they chose a strategy without indicating the choice rule. Perhaps these rules were obvious to them, but we as researchers would have to detect them and make them explicit. So far they were no clear to us.